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Abstract—Conventional online social networks (OSNs) are
implemented in a centralized manner. Although centralization
is a convenient way for implementing OSNs, it has several well
known drawbacks. Chief among them are the risks they pose to
the security and privacy of the information maintained by the
OSN; and the loss of control over the information contributed
by individual members.
These concerns prompted several attempts to create decentral-
ized OSNs, or DOSNs. The basic idea underlying these attempts,
is that each member of a social network keeps its data under
its own control, instead of surrendering it to a central host;
providing access to it to other members of the OSN according
to its own access-control policy. Unfortunately all existing DOSN
projects have a very serious limitation. Namely, they are unable to
subject the membership of a DOSN, and the interaction between
its members, to any global policy.
We adopt the decentralization idea underlying DOSNs, com-
plementing it with a means for specifying and enforcing a wide
range of policies over the membership of a social community, and
over the interaction between its disparate distributed members.
And we do so in a scalable fashion.
Index Terms—distributed; social networks; decentralization;
global policy; privacy; security; search; social community
I. INTRODUCTION
An online social network (OSN) can be defined broadly as
a community of people that interact with each other via some
electronic media, which generally operates subject to a policy
that may regulate the membership of the community, and the
manner in which its members interact with each other. The pol-
icy of a purely social community is often informal, imprecise,
implicit and only occasionally enforced. But such policy needs
to be tightened for an OSN, because its membership can be
larger than that of a purely social community, and its members
tend to be less familiar with each other. Therefore, the policy
of an OSN needs to be explicit and well defined, and it needs
to be more strictly enforced, largely via computational means,
so that it can establish desired regularities over the OSN.
Such policies are easily implementable via the conventional
types of OSNs—such as the currently popular Facebook,
Google+, and Twitter—because of their centralized architec-
ture. That is each such OSN employs a virtually central host—
which may be a centrally managed cluster of computers—that
mediates all interactions between its members, subject to a
policy defined by the host. This central host also maintains
the information supplied by the members of the community
in question.
Unfortunately although centralization is a very convenient
way for implementing OSNs, it has several well known draw-
backs, which include: (a) lack of scalability; (b) the existence
of a single point of failure; (c) the risks to the security
and privacy of information maintained by the central host;
and (d) the loss of control over the information contributed
by individual members. The first two of these drawbacks
can be mitigated via very large, complex, and expensive
infrastructures—like those used by Facebook and Twitter.
But the risk to security and privacy, and the loss of control
over private information1 are harder to mitigate, because they
are mostly the consequence of centralization itself. Indeed,
maintaining the state of the membership of an OSN, and
the history of interaction between members, under a single
administrative domain makes it vulnerable to various malicious
attacks. Such attacks can be mounted by insiders, say the
programmer that maintains the software of the OSN; and by
hackers from the outside, for whom the central repository of
information is likely to be very lucrative.
Security seems not to be of much concern to the hundreds
of millions of current users of Facebook, Twitter, and similar
OSNs. But they are, or should be, of serious concern to
other types of OSNs, whose members exchange more sensitive
information—such as private medical and financial informa-
tion; and information about the business of an enterprise,
exchanged between its employees. We will consider examples
of such OSNs in the following section.
Such concerns about centralized OSNs prompted several
attempts to create decentralized OSNs, or DOSNs; such as
LotusNet [1], Safebook [2], PeerSoN[3], and others. The basic
idea underlying all these attempts to the decentralization, is
that each member of the community in question should keep
its data under its own control, instead of surrendering it to a
central host, providing access to it to other members of the
DOSN according to its own access-control policy.
Unfortunately all existing DOSN projects have a very
serious limitation. Namely, they are unable to subject the
membership of a DOSN, and the interaction between its
members, to any global policy. This is a very serious limitation
of the DOSN architecture, because, as pointed out above, an
1Henceforth, we will mostly talk about security, interpreting this term
broadly.
enforced global policy is generally essential for an OSNs, as
it helps make it into a social community.
The Contribution of this Paper: We will adopt in this
paper the decentralization idea underlying DOSNs, comple-
menting it with a means for specifying and enforcing a wide
range of policies over the membership of a social community,
and over the interaction between its disparate distributed
members. And we shall do so in a scalable manner.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces examples of OSNs for which security is critical,
and would thus benefit from decentralization. Section III
introduces examples of policies that are often essential for an
OSN—particularly for the types of OSNs for which security
tends to be critical—but which cannot be established under
DOSN. Section IV provides a very brief outline of the LGI
middleware, which serves as the basis for this work. Section V
introduces our model of decentralized OSN—we call it OSC,
for “online social community,” where the term “community” is
meant to suggest two things: first, a decentralized nature, like
that of purely social communities; and second, the existence of
a shared policy, which characterize most social communities,
and which under OSC is enforced. Section VI is an imple-
mented case study that demonstrates how this abstract model
can be used for a concrete application. The related works are
discussed in Section VII. And we conclude in Section VIII.
II. EXAMPLES OF OSNS, FOR WHICH SECURITY IS
IMPORTANT
We distinguish here between two types of OSNs: (1) au-
tonomous OSNs, which are not bound by any outside authority;
and (2) bound OSNs, which operate in the context of some
organization, which has jurisdiction over it. We focus in this
section on the security needs of these two types of OSNs, and
on the risks to security that centralization poses to them. We
will discuss both types of OSNs, but we will focus, here and
in the rest of the paper, on the latter one.
ßAutonomous OSNs Consider a set of physicians who form
an OSN that enables them to consult with each other about
various medical issues they confront. This MD-Consultation
OSN is to admit only qualified MDs as members, and may
grow to be quite large if physicians all over the world join it.
The information exchanged between members of such OSN is
clearly very sensitive.
So, having the consultation process mediated by a central
host, and having the information exchanged between the
physicians maintained centrally by this host can seriously
compromise the security of both the doctors and their patients.
The risk here is particularly serious because the host of such
an OSN is likely to become a target for attackers, since
the information maintained by it can be exploited for illicit
financial gains.
There are many potential autonomous OSNs that exchange
similarly sensitive information; such as an OSN that enables
people who suffer from a certain malady, to share their
experience with each other, and with their doctors; an OSN
formed by a certain type of workers for exchanging their views
about their employers; an OSN used by students to exchange
information about their teachers, and many others.
ßBound OSNs There is a growing realization[4] that OSNs
that operate within an organization—such as manufactur-
ing, commercial enterprises, medical centers, or even the
military—can be beneficial for it. This seems to be particularly
the case for OSNs that provide for micro-blogging, as is
evident from the recent purchase of the Yammer—a prominent
micro-blogging OSN operating within organizations[5]—by
Microsoft, for $1.2 Billion. We will have more to say about
Yammer itself, but first we outline some of functional features
one can expect from this kind of OSN.
Consider a large and geographically distributed enterprise
E that provides a centralized micro-blogging OSN for its
employees. Suppose that such an OSN, which we call BE ,
distinguishes between groups of employees, enabling the
members of each groups to communicate with each other. Such
groups may be the following: (a) all the employees of E; (b)
the non-managerial staff of E; (c) the managerial staff of E;
and (d) members of various task forces operating in E. Note
that these groups may overlap partially, as a single employee
may belong to several groups.
Let the members of BE hold a profile, which is a set of
attributes of each member, which are visible to the whole OSN
and can be indexed and searched. They communicate mostly
via micro-blogs by means of some form of a publish/subscribe
(P/S) mechanism. When using P/S, members can publish posts
and build subscription relationships with each other, in some
analogy to the following relationship in Twitter. We assume
that each post contains two parts: type and body. The type is
denoted by using #type# at the beginning of a post. Besides
publish/subscribe based communication, members can send
direct messages to each other, which we assume here to be
preceded by a type field, like a post.
The Need for Security: We will distinguish here between
two types of needed security. First, the information exchanged
between the employees of enterprise E can carry sensitive
information about the business of this enterprise. It is therefore
important for this information not to be exposed to the outside,
at least not on a large scale.
Second, one may need to prevent information exchanged
between the members of a certain group of BE from being
accessible to anybody else, or to certain other groups. For
example, suppose that enterprise E has several task forces that
consult to other companies, some of which may compete with
each other. And suppose that the members of each such task
force form a group in BE . It is obviously paramount for these
subgroups not to have access to each other’s information.
The Risks to Security due to Centralization: There are
two types of centralization to be considered, which we call
strong and weak. Strong centralization is like the one practiced
by Yammer, the Microsoft OSN that we mentioned above.
Yammer provides services to a host of different enterprises—
they currently claim to serve about 200,000 of them. Yammer
supports policies that provide necessary separation between
the various enterprises it serves. But the information belonging
to all these enterprises is maintained centrally by the Yammer
system. Such centralization of commercial and industrial in-
formation of many companies, is likely to attract attacks from
the inside of Yammer, and from the outside.
A better approach would be to use an intramural Yammer-
like OSN. This, weaker form of centralization, would be
much safer than using Yammer. But if this system relies on a
centralized database, it would still be vulnerable to breaches
of security. Indeed, if all the information generated by the BE
is available to its software, then the rogue programmers of this
OSN will have a fairly free access to all of it, disregarding the
required boundaries between different groups.
III. A SAMPLE OF POLICIES THAT AN OSN MAY NEED TO
ENFORCE
We illustrate here the type of communal policies that an
OSN may need to establish. By “communal” we mean either
global policy that is to govern all members of an OSN, or
a policy that governs some subgroup of its members. All
the policies discussed here can be easily established by a
centralized OSN, but none of them can be established under
the DOSN architecture.
We will distinguish here between three types of communal
policies, and will motivate some of them in the context of
the BE example OSN, introduced in the previous section. We
will show in Section VI how such policies can be realized in
decentralized OSNs.
ßMembership Control Control over membership is crucial to
many social communities, whether it is autonomous or bound.
Such control may have several complementary aspects. We
will consider three of these below.
First, one may require that to be a member of a given
OSN one needs to authenticate itself via a specified kind of
certificate. One may think that this policy can be established
under the DOSN architecture by having every member of
the DOSN in question require every interlocutor of his to
authenticate itself in a specified manner. But DOSN has no
way for ensuring that all its members behave in this way.
(The inability of DOSN to enforce communal policies is even
more obvious in the rest of our examples below.)
Second, one may require that to be a member of an OSN
one needs to garner the support of several (say three) current
members of it.
Third, it is often important to establish some procedure for
removing members from a given OSN. This can be done in
many ways. For example, consider a OSN that has a member
that plays the role of a manager. Now, let the manager be
given the power to remove any current member x of the OSN,
simply by sending it a message remove. Then x should lose
its ability to interact with other members of the OSN.
ßConstraints on the Behavior of Members of an OSN Some-
times one needs to impose constraints on what members can
do. Such constraints may depend on the profile of individual
members, and on the history of their interaction with others.
We have just seen an example of such constraints: only a
member that plays the role of manager can send the remove
message to others. And any member that gets such a message
must cease all communication with others.
More generally—but stated in the context of the BE OSN—
the type of messages that members are allowed to send, or the
type of posts that they are allowed to issue, may depend on
their roles in this OSN, which may be represented by their
profile. As another example, a member should be able to
force an interlocutor to reduce the frequency of messages it is
sending to it, or to cease sending messages to it altogether.
ßGlobal Access Control (AC) Policies One of the in-
tended consequences of decentralization under DOSN is that
it enables each member to apply its own AC policy to its
own data—e.g., to the set of posts it produced, which are
maintained in its own database. The problem with this aspect
of DOSN is that, unlike the case of Facebook or Twitter, a
member of an OSN may not have the complete authority over
the data it maintains. A case in point is a bound OSN, such
as the BE OSN introduced in Section II. The posts being
produced by the various members of this OSN really belong
to the enterprise E, which thus has the ultimate authority about
how they should be distributed. The enterprise may relegate to
individual members the right to apply their own AC policies,
provided that these policies conform to the global policy of
an enterprise. For example, the global policy of the BE may
be that a group of members assigned to deal with the business
of a given client-company can communicate only with each
other, as long as they operate as members of that group—recall
that under BE , a single person may belong to several groups.
IV. THE LAW-GOVERNED INTERACTION (LGI)
MIDDLEWARE—AN OVERVIEW
LGI is a middleware that can govern the interaction (via
message exchange) between distributed actors, by enforcing an
explicitly specified law—and possibly multiple laws—about
such interaction. We provide here a brief, and rather abstract,
overview of LGI; focusing on what is the most relevant to this
paper. A more detailed presentation of LGI, and a tutorial of
it, can be found in its manual [6]—which describes the release
of an experimental implementation of the main parts of LGI.
For additional information and examples the reader is referred
to a host of published papers, some of which will be cited
explicitly in due course.
The rest of this section is organized as follows. We start,
with the local nature of the interaction laws under LGI—a
key characteristics of this middleware that enables many of
the novel features of it. We then discuss the following aspects
of LGI: the structure of its laws; and the law enforcement
mechanism.
ßThe Local Nature of Interaction Laws Although the pur-
pose of interaction laws is to govern the exchange of messages
between different distributed actors, they do not do so directly
under LGI. Rather, an LGI law L governs the interaction
of any actor operating under it, essentially by controlling its
ability to send messages to others, and to receive messages
from them2. A law L is local to each actor x operating under
it, in that its rulings are based solely on the local state of x and
on the event that occurs at it, and are completely independent
of the coincidental state and events occurring anywhere else in
the system. Such a law can be enforced locally, and thus very
scalably, in a manner described in Section IV. Moreover, the
locality of LGI laws has several other beneficial consequences,
some of which will be pointed out in due course.
It should also be pointed out that although locality consti-
tutes a strict constraint on the structure of laws, it does not
reduce their expressive power. This has been proved in [6]. In
particular, despite its structural locality, an LGI law can have
global effect over what is called an L-community, defined as
the set of actors operating under a common law L.
ßLGI Laws—a Definition An interaction law (or simply a
law) L is defined over three elements—described with respect
to a given actor x that operates under this law: (1) a set E of
interactive events that may occur at any actor, including the
arrival of a message at x, and the sending of a message by
it; (2) the state (also called the control-state) Sx associated
with each actor x, which is distinct from the internal state of
x, that is invisible to the law; and (3) a set O of interactive
operations that can be mandated by a law, to be carried out at x
upon the occurrence of interactive events at it; this set includes
operations that forward messages to others, along with some
other types of operations that have an effect on the flow of
message into x and from it.
Now, the role of a law under LGI is to decide what should
be done in response to the occurrence of any interactive event
at an actor operating under this law. This decision, with respect
to actor x, is defined by the following mapping:
L : E × Sx → Sx × (O)
∗ (1)
In other words, for any a given (event, state) pair, the law
mandates a new state (which may imply no state change), as
well as a (possibly empty) sequence of interactive operations.
Note, in particular, that the ruling of the law at a given moment
of time depends on the state of x at that moment; and that the
evolution of the state itself is determined by the law, and by
the history of interactive-events at x. LGI laws are, therefore,
stateful, and sensitive to the history of interaction.
Note that the law is a complete function, so that any map-
ping defined by Formula 1 is considered a valid law—which
means that a law of this form is inherently self consistent. This
does not mean, of course, that a law cannot be wrong. It can
be wrong in the sense that it does not work as intended by its
designer; but this is not a matter of inconsistency.
Finally, it is worth pointing out that while Formula 1 is
a definition of the semantics of laws3, it does not specify a
language for writing laws. In fact, the current implementation
of LGI supports two different law-languages, one based on the
logic-programming language Prolog, and the other based on
2In fact, a law can also cause messages to be changed and rerouted, and it
can change the state of an agent.
3Modulo the fact that the sets E of events and O of operations have not
been fully spelled out here.
Java. But the choice of language has no effect on the semantics
of LGI, as long as the chosen language is sufficiently powerful
to specify all possible mappings defined by Formula 1.
ßThe Decentralized Law Enforcement Mechanism Consider
an actor x that chooses to operate under a law L. It can do
so by adopting a generic controller as its mediator, loading
law L into it. Once thus adopted, this controller is denoted by
TLx —meaning that it operates under law L, serving actor x—
and the pair 〈x, TLx 〉, is called agent x and is referred to as an
L-agent—and sometimes simply an “agent”. This adoption,
which signifies the birth of agent x, is one of the interactive
events of LGI, so that the law in question has the possibility
of refusing to be adopted by this actor, and can mandate some
initialization for it, if it does not refuse.
Note the fundamental difference between a bare actor
and its agent: while the interactive behavior of an actor
is unpredictable—unless its code is known—the interactive
behavior of an L-agent is known to conform to law L.
Figure 1 depicts the manner in which a pair of agents,
operating under possibly different laws, exchange a message.
(An agent is depicted here by a dashed oval that includes
an actor and its controller.) Note the dual nature of control
exhibited here: the transfer of a message is first mediated
by the sender’s controller, subject to the sender’s law, and
then by the controller of the receiver, subject to its law.
This dual control, which is a direct consequence of the local
nature of LGI laws, has some important consequences. In
particular, it facilitates flexible interoperation and it enables
more sophisticated control than possible under many AC
mechanisms that provide control only on the receiver side.
The overhead incurred by this kind of control turns out to
be relatively small. In circa 2000 it was measured to be around
50 microseconds for fairly common laws, which is negligible
for communication over WAN. This is one of the results of a
comprehensive study of this overhead in [7].
Finally, we note that a generic controller needs to be trusted
to enforce correctly any law it is adopted with. There are
several ways for providing such trusted controllers as the
TCB (Trusted Computing Base) of the system in question.
In the case of a bound OSN, like our BE example, we expect
this to be done by the enterprise E, in the context of which
BE operates. This company could construct what is called a
controller service (CoS) that maintains a set of well tested
controller pools, each of which can host a number—it is
usually in the hundreds—of individual controllers that can be
used by arbitrary actors, upon request. For other types of OSNs
one expects the CoS to be maintained by some commercial
company that provides its services for a fee.
Note, therefore, that a controller TLx and the actor x that
adopted it would run on different hosts. This would help
prevent x corrupting its own controller. Even if a controller is
hacked, since it does not keep the messages it passes, there is
no way to get the information of the whole history. And since
it would be much harder to compromise many controllers than
one, the global view of the whole system will not be obtained.
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Fig. 1. Interaction between a pair of agents, mediated by a pair of controllers
under possibly different laws.
V. A MODEL OF DECENTRALIZED OSN
We introduce here a model of decentralized OSNs that
differs from the current approach to the decentralization em-
ployed under the current DOSN architecture, in that it enables
the enforcement of communal policies over it. We call a
specific OSN under this model an online social community
or an OSC (or sometime simply a community), and we refer
to this model itself as the OSC-model.
Now, a community C under the OSC model is broadly
defined as a 4-tuple 〈M, L, T, S〉, where M is the set of
members of C; L is the policy that governs this community,
which we call a law (an LGI-law, to be exact); T is a set
of generic LGI controllers that serve as the middleware that
enforces law L; and S is a set of components that support the
operations of C, and is specific to it—this set is called the
support of C, and it may be empty.
We now elaborate on this schematic definition of the OSC
model by discussing the following aspects of it: (1) the
anatomy of a community under OSC; (2) the launching of
an OSC-community; (3) the operations of a community; and
(4) possible extension of this model. Note that an example of
an OSC-community is described in Section VI.
ßThe Anatomy of a Community Under OSC We describe
here the anatomy of a community C under this model by
elaborating on its various components, and on the relations
between them. This anatomy is depicted schematically in
Figure 2.
The Set M of Members: An individual member m
of a community C is a triple 〈user,mediator, database〉,
where user is usually a human, operating via some kind
of computational platform, like a smart phone; mediator is
an LGI-controller that mediates all interactions between this
member and the rest of the community—as well as between
the other two components of the member in question—subject
to law LC (which we denote by LC ); and database, which
is an optional part of the member, is the private database of
m that maintains information associated with this member,
such as the set of Twitter-like micro-blog posted by m, or its
Facebook-like page. This database is meant to be controlled
by the user, and maintained either on its own host, or on some
cloud. (Note, however, that a community that operates within
an organization may require the databases of members to be
maintained somewhere in the Intranet of this organization.)
The Law LC of community C: It is the law which
endows an OSC-community with its overall structure and
behavior. And the fact that the law can, in principle, be any
well formed LGI law (cf. Section IV) endows this model with
great deal generality regarding the policy that can be enforced
over a community.
The set T of LGI Controllers: Every user can create its
own controller, using the software provided by the released
LGI middleware. But if malicious corruption of controllers by
their users is of concern, then it is better for the members of
a community to adopt controllers created and maintained by a
trusted controller service (CoS), so that they can authenticate
each other as bona fide LGI controllers. For such a CoS to
be trusted to provide genuine controllers, this service needs
to be managed by a trusted organization. In particular, the
CoS may be managed by the organization in the context of
which the community is to operate—as in the case discussed
in Section VI. Alternatively, the CoS may be created and
managed for general use, by a reputed organization which has
no interest in the applications that use its controllers. Such
applications can be any kind OSC-community. For more about
the security and trustworthiness of controllers see Section IV
and [6].
The Support S: An OSC-community may require ser-
vices of various components that are not themselves mem-
bers of this community. Here are some examples of such
components: (a) a certification authority (CA) used for the
authentication the various members of the community; (b)
a naming service that provides unique names of community
members; (c) an index service for searching; and (d) a net-
working service for maintaining various networking structures
of the community—more about which in Section V. It is worth
pointing out that this set of support components may be empty
for some communities.
ßThe Launching of an OSC-Community A specific OSC-
community, C is launched by constructing its foundation—
described below—and then having individual members join it.
The construction of the foundation of a community C consists
of the following steps: (a) defining law LC under which
this community is to operate; (b) implementing the required
support components; and (c) selecting, or constructing, a
controller-service (CoS) for the use of this community—or
providing means for prospective members to construct their
own, TPM-based, controllers.
Once the foundation of C is constructed, anybody can
attempt to join it as a member, via the following three steps:
(a) deploying its private database—if one is required by law
LC—with an API required by this law; (b) adopting an LGI-
controller, and loading law LC into it; and (c) providing this
controller with a pointer to its database, if any. It should be
pointed out that such an attempt to join a given community
C may fail, if the conditions for joining imposed by law LC
are not satisfied.
ßThe Operation of a Community Consider a member x of a
community C sending a message m to another member y. The
message first arrives at the controller of x, that operates under
law LC . These controllers would then carry out the ruling
of law LC , which can mandate the execution of any number
of the following kind of actions: (a) change its own state in
some way; (b) communicate with the database of x; (c) send
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Fig. 2. The Anatomy of an OSC Community
the message m, or some other message, to the controller of
the original target of x; and (d) send some other messages
to the controllers of some other members, or to some of the
support components of the community. Among other things,
this means that members of a community interact with each
other via their controllers, and the controllers communicate
with each other.
It is worth pointing out here that LGI provides an important
trust modality which is critical to this model. This trust
modality is called law-based trust, or simply L-trust, and can
be introduced, broadly, as follows: any pair of interacting
LGI-controllers can identify, cryptographically, each other as
genuine controllers, and can identify the law, under which their
interlocutors operates. One consequence of this is that the law
LC of the given community C can be written so that members
of C can interact only with other members of C. Now, L-
trust can be defined as follows: members of a community C
can trust each other’s interactive behavior to comply with
their common law LC . For a complete definition of this trust
modality and some of its consequences see [8].
Another important observation about the behavior of a
community under this model needs to be made: the ruling of
a law for a given event that occurs at a controller depends on
the state of this controller, which may be different for different
members. This difference can come from some certificates
submitted by the user to its controller, which may authenticate
the role of the user in the organization in question. And the
state may change dynamically in response to some interactive
activity of the community. For example, the manager of the
community under our BE community, may be allowed by
the law of BE community to transfer its managerial baton to
some other member, which would then be able to send revoke
messages. In other words, the members of a community C may
not be equal under its law LC .
ßDiscussion: on Networking and on Scalability We have
already pointed out that some capabilities are easier to be
provided via centralized OSN than via decentralized one. We
have focused on the imposition of communal policies over an
OSC in this paper. Another capability that is problematic under
decentralized OSNs is the ability to analyze the networking
relationship implicit in the community. Consider for example
the friend relationship of Facebook, and let us examine its
realization in an OSC.
It is easy to have each member of an OSC list his friends—
we have done with a similar relation in Section VI—but it is
very hard and expensive to analyze the entire friendship-graph,
when this relation is recorded in such a distributed manner. Of
course, such global analysis, which is central to Facebook, is
not required for all kinds of OSN. But it is often required, and
must be provided for.
A reasonable way for enabling global analysis of a network
implicit in an OSC, is to maintain it explicitly in a central
manner. That is, we maintain the friendship relation (or any
other kind of relation between members) in a central place, as
part of what we have called the support of an OSC, and then
provide these components with various analysis tools. This is
a reasonable solution under two conditions: (a) the relation in
question is not, itself, highly sensitive from the privacy and
security viewpoint; and (b) the central network component is
not used too frequently, so it would not reduce substantially
the scalability of the OSC in question.
More generally, an OSC may have several centralized
support components, such as indices of various kinds. If
these components are not used very frequently they would
not seriously undermine the scalability of an OSN, due to
the decentralization of its data and of its policy enforcement
mechanism.
ßTowards an Extension of this Model We have seen in
Section II that a social community may have several groups, or
sub-communities. All such groups may operate under a single
law, as demonstrated in Section VI. But such a single global
law may be hard to design, hard to reason about, and inflexible
with respect to changes of the OSC.
These problems can be alleviated via the concept of con-
formance hierarchy of LGI laws [9]. Using this concept, an
OSC can be built to be governed by a tree of laws. The root of
this tree, say LR, would govern the entire community, while
each sub-group g of that community would be governed by a
law Lg defined as subordinate to LR, and is thus constraint to
conform to it. This way of governing an OSC is very modular
and flexible; and it will be described in a forthcoming paper.
VI. A CASE STUDY
In this section, we describe the implementation of the BE
community, introduced in Section II. It has been implemented
in the scale of more than two hundred users as a proof
of concept. This community operates in the context of a
large and geographically distributed enterprise E, providing
a micro-blogging OSN for its employees, as a complement
to its existing office systems. BE enables the members of
various groups of employees to communicate with each other.
The groups of this community are (1) all employees; (2)
management staff; (3) non-management staff; (4) members of
task force t1, which is providing consultation service for an
enterprise E1; (5) members of task force t2, which is providing
consultation service for another enterprise E2. These groups
could partially overlap, in the sense that a single employee
may belong to several groups.
As described in Section II, there are two modes of com-
munication in this community: publish/subscribe and direct
message. And each post or message contains two parts: type
and body. For both communication modes, there are certain
global policies can be imposed to the community to control
members’ behaviors. We will discuss them in the following
section.
Each member of the community holds a profile in its
controller, as well as several internal states, which are used
for some functionalities and not visible for regular members.
A profile is a group of attributes of the user, which are visible
to the whole community and can be searched and indexed.
There are mainly two types of attributes in the profile. One
type of the attributes is the relatively stable attributes, like
real name, login ID, position, group identity, age, etc. These
items usually require users to provide certificates in order to
get them in the profile by the rule of authentication. Since
these attributes are stable, an index for searching is able to
be built on them. Another type of attributes is the dynamic
ones, such as interest, skill set, last ten posts, etc. Although
these items don’t require certificate, not all of them can be
changed by the member arbitrarily. For example, subscriber
list is handled by the subscription mechanism, reputation is
maintained by controller according to the rates gotten from
other members and an attendance attribute could be decided
by the sign-in/sign-out time. We call these user-unchangeable
dynamic attributes and the certified attributes together as
controlled attributes, and the rest attributes as discretion
attributes. The internal states are the states maintained by
the controller for certain functions of the community. For
instance, the frequency of publishing is used for preventing a
member overwhelming the community by violently publishing
posts.
The Law of the BE Community:
The law B of the BE Community is used for regulating ev-
ery aspects of the operations and behaviors of the community.
We split it into several parts according to their functionalities.
Due to lack of space, we only discuss the detailed law of some
functionalities of the communities. In Section VI, we discuss
how a user becomes a member of the BE community and
its groups, how it configures its profile, and how a member
is removed. Section VI shows the communication mechanism
and the imposition over it. We discuss other functionalities
which are needed to be a complete OSN in Section VI.
ßMember Profile and Membership Control
To join the community, a member needs to adopt a controller
under law B. Rule R1 allows a user to join the community
by presenting a certificate from a CA run by the enterprise
in question to prove that it is an employee. Once certificate
is verified by the controller, the set of attributes in its profile
will be inserted into the user’s control state. An example of an
attribute is role(manager). There are two types of attributes in
the profile: certified and uncertified. The certified attributes are
the relatively stable ones, like real name, login ID, position,
age, etc. These items can also be obtained by providing
certificates after the adoption. Rule R2 allows the user to join
the group ti by providing a group certificate. It will add an
attribute ti to its profile, as well as an access control filter
which we will discuss in the next section. A database access
API is provided for members. It supports CRUD (create, read,
update and delete) functions for users to access their database.
When adopting a controller, a member is required to provide
the address of the database to associate with its id. In our
example, the member can only provide the address with the
enterprise domain so that the enterprise has the physical access
to it and can employ firewall to protect it.
Another type of attributes is the dynamic ones, such as
interest, skill set, last ten posts, etc. Although these items
don’t require certificate, not all of them can be changed by the
member arbitrarily. We call the user-unchangeable dynamic
R1)
UPON adopted(X,cert(issuer(ca),subj(X),
attr(A))) :-
do(+A).
R2)
UPON certified(X,cert(issuer(ca),subj(X),
attr(ti))) :-
do(+ti);
do(+filter(group(ti))).
R3)
UPON sent(X,addProfile(Attribute(Value)),
X) :-
if ( ¬ (Attribute in
controlledAttributes) )
then do(+Attribute(Value)).
R4)
UPON sent(X,updateProfile(Attribute(Value)),
X) :-
if ( ¬ (Attribute in
controlledAttributes) )
then do(-Attribute);
do(+Attribute(Value)).
R5)
UPON sent(X,addFilter(Attribute(Value)),X) :-
do(+filter(Attribute(value))).
R6)
UPON sent(X,#revoke#,Y) :-
if(role(manager)@CS) then do(Forward);
else do(Deliver(X,notAllow,X)).
R7)
UPON arrived(X,#revoke#,Y) :-
update(certificateBlacklist);
inform(certificateBlacklist);
do(Quit).
R8)
UPON sent(X,#db#M,X) :-
if(M in CRUD)
then do(Release(X,M,DB)).
R9)
UPON submitted(DB,Q,X) :-
do(Deliver).
Fig. 3. Law B: Member’s Profile and Membership Control
attributes and the certified attributes together as controlled
attributes, and the rest attributes as discretion attributes. For the
discretion attributes, user can directly add some of them into
its profile via Rule R3 and update them via Rule R4. Rule R5
shows how a user sets up its subscription filter. Sometimes the
user may not want to be subscribed by everyone. The existing
way to do that in other social networks is to put the subscriber
into blacklist, or we say to block specific user. This can only
happen after somebody initiated or requested the subscription
and needs to be done manually. However, our mechanism can
prevent subscription by specifying a certain kind of attributes.
User can use Rule R5 to add the filter content into control
state. Its controller will only allow the members who have the
required attributes to subscribe to it. The following operations
will be described in Section VI.
Finally, rules R6 and R7 regulate the removal of members
from the community. Rule R6 shows that only the man-
ager role can remove a member from the community. Non-
managers are not allowed to use the type revoke when sending
messages. When the revoke message arrives at the member’s
controller, according to Rule R7, the controller will directly
terminate the connection to the actor and then put its certificate
to the blacklist and broadcast to all controllers. Next time
when another actor tries to use this certificate to adopt a
controller, the controller will not verify it. The member has
no way to control or avoid that. This rule guarantees that its
participation in this community is seized immediately after
the manager removed it and cannot get back again using the
same certificate. This is just an example of how to handle the
membership removal. Other methods, such as suspension, can
also be supported. Rule R8 shows the API provided for the
database access. When the member sends a CRUD message,
the controller will forward the query to its database. If the
query is a Read request, the controller will deliver the query
result when the database replies, as in Rule R9.
ßCommunication
There are two modes of communication in this community:
publish/subscribe and direct messaging. By P/S, members can
publish posts and build subscription relationships with each
other, in some analogy to the relationship following in Twitter.
For a member to subscribe to the posts from another member,
the subscriber s sends a subscription request to the publisher
p. When p receives the request, it will add s to its subscriber
list unless such subscription is prohibited by the law, or if p
itself blocks the subscription. When a post is published by a
member, it will be automatically pushed to all its subscribers.
Moreover, members can also send direct messages to each
other, which can also be controlled.
We will show later in this section, how the communication
is enabled and controlled. The control over communication has
two complementary parts: global control and local control. The
global control is imposed on every member of the community,
but can be sensitive to the state of members, while the local
control is discretionary to each member. We discuss both of
controls below, and the according law later.
Global Control: The global control over
publish/subscribe is imposed on both publishing and
subscription. The control over publishing is on what types of
posts a member can publish. For example, only the managerial
staff can publish posts with type management. Upon
publishing, a management post is allowed to be published
only when the member has the attribute role(managerial) in
its profile.
The control on the subscription regulates who can subscribe
to whom, and to which types of posts. Essentially, it is
defined by a condition C on the profiles of the publisher and
subscriber. An example of such global policies is that only
the members from a same group can talk to each other. The
problem is that there is no single place where these profiles
can be evaluated because of the decentralization. To solve this
problem, our law forces every subscription request to include
the profile of the subscriber. And then it has the condition
C to be evaluated and acted upon at the publisher side. This
can be achieved by checking the profiles of the publisher and
subscriber and rejecting the subscription request if the two
members are from different groups.
The control over sending direct message is similar to the one
over publishing. Certain types of direct messages are allowed
to be sent only when the members have the required attributes
in their profiles. For instance, only the manager role can send
the revoke message.
The control on receiving the direct messaging is different
from the one on subscription. Whenever a member sends a
direct message, its controller will append its profile to the
message. Upon the arrival of the message at the receiver side,
the controller of the receiver will not deliver the message if
its profile does not satisfy the condition of receiving it.
Local Control: Sometimes, a member does not want
to be subscribed by certain members, it can block the sub-
scription requests from them. To achieve this, we introduce a
profile attribute called filter. If a member adds a filter filter(X)
in its profile, its cannot be subscribed by the member who
has attribute X in profile. As we described above, whenever
a subscriber s sends the subscription request to a publisher p,
it will be forced to attach its profile along with the request.
When the request arrives at the publisher’s controller, s will
not be added to p’s subscriber list if its profile has the banned
attributes in the filter. This rule of filter is just an example.
More complex uses of the filter, such as OR or XOR, could
also be achieved.
The Law: The rules of law B that implements these
provisions are defined in Figure 4 and described below.
R10)
UPON sent(X,publish(P),X) :- group(ti)@CS
if (typeof(P) == #management# and ¬
role(manager)@CS)
then return;
updateProfile(lastTenPosts(P));
updateDB(P);
if(subList[group(ti)] = []) then return;
else forEach(subscriber in
subList[group(ti)])
do(Forward(X,P,subscriber)).
R11)
UPON arrived(X,P,Y) :-
do(Deliver);
do(inform(X,P,Y)).
R12)
UPON sent(X,requestSubscribe(profile),Y) :-
do(Forward).
R13)
UPON arrived(X,requestSubscribe(profile),
Y) :- group(ti)@CS
if(filter(Attribute(Value))@CS and
Attribute(Value)@profile)
then
do(Forward(Y,subscribeNotAllowed,X));
else do(updateSublist[group(ti)]);
do(Forward(Y,subscribeAllowed,X)).
R14)
UPON sent(X,M,Y) :-
do(Forward(X,M(profile),Y)).
R15)
UPON arrived(X,M(profile),Y) :-
if(group@CS == group@profile)
then do(Deliver(X,M,Y)).
Fig. 4. Law B: Communication
In Rule R10, when the user wants to publish a post to
its subscribers, the controller will read local subscriber list
and push the post to each of them. It will also update its
attribute lastTenPosts of its profile in its control state. When
the subscriber receives the post or message, according to the
Rule R11, controller will show the post to the user. In the
meantime, to handle the situation that the user is not online,
the controller can store the post or message into local file
system, or use other ways to inform users, for example by
sending as email. Also, the controller can save the last several
posts for the search functions. Note that if the post is of the
type of management, only the managerial staff can publish it.
According to Rule R12, any user can send a subscription
request to any user. The controller will attach its profile to the
request. In Rule R13, when the request arrives at the user,
the controller will check whether there is an access control
filter in its control state. If there is not, it will add the request
user to the subscriber list. If there are filters, it will examine
whether this user satisfies by checking the required attributes
of the profile. If the requester satisfies, the controller will add
it to the subscriber list and send back the result to the request
user.
If a member wants to send a direct message to a specific
member, its controller will append its profile to the message, as
shown in Rule R14. When the message arrives at the controller
of the destination member, it will check the group id in control
state to see whether it matches the group id of the sender. If
it does, the member is allowed to read the message. If the
member belongs to a different group from the sender, the
controller will discard the message, according to Rule R15.
ßOther Implemented Functionalities
Due to lack of space, we do not cover all parts of the law for
this community. However, following functionalities are very
useful and important in forming a complete OSN. We discuss
the general idea of them.
Naming and Addressing: When an agent joins a commu-
nity, it must have a way of naming and locating other members
of the community. After all, one joins a community only if one
wishes to interact with some members. We employ a server,
called secretary, that simply acts as a naming and locating
service, negotiating with agents wishing to join the group in
order for each agent to have a unique name within that group.
More details about this mechanism are provided by [10].
Search: Search capability is also necessary for an OSN.
It’s relatively straightforward in the centralization, comparing
to be achieved in a decentralized manner. In decentralized
OSN, one can think of two search techniques—index search
and content search. The Distributed Hash Table, which is
used by most of DOSN approaches, cannot do content search.
The content search can be achieved via a gossip style search
protocol—the search query initiator sends the query to its
neighbors and then the neighbors forward the query to their
neighbors. This search method is widely used by some P2P
systems such as Gnutella[11]. Both types of search, especially
the DHT, are not secure and easy to be undermined[12],
because they need the untrusted members substantially to carry
out the search correctly. It’s very vulnerable if there is no
regulation imposed on each participant. We implemented the
gossip style search, and used TTL (Time To Live) and forward
threshold to improve efficiency. We can make DHT secure
by implementing it by law with similar technology discussed
before, but this is beyond the scope of this paper.
VII. RELATED WORK
The concern about the security issues of centralized OSNs
motivated several attempts to decentralize OSNs, creating
several versions of what is called DOSNs. PeerSoN[13], [14],
[3], [15], [16], Safebook[17], [18], [2], and LotusNet [1],
[19] are the main attempts among others. The basic idea
underlying all these projects is that each member of the social
networks keeps the data under its own control, instead of
surrendering it to a central host. This is a necessary measure
of decentralization, but it is not sufficient. Because, as we
explain in Section III, social network requires some global, or
communal, policy to operate under. But none of the attempts
known to us at the implementation of DOSNs provides any
means for establishing such policies.
Moreover, all these attempts adopt the substrate of DHT to
implement the p2p design. As we discussed in Section VI,
DHT itself is not secure under the context of heterogeneous
and distributed network and easy to be compromised. It’s
not able to defend some attacks if it cannot establish certain
global policy to protect it. Furthermore, DHT is incapable
of performing content search. Though some improvements or
work-arounds are employed to provide limited content search,
these are way off the basic requirement of an OSN.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper addresses the risks to privacy and security posed
by conventional centralized online social networks (OSNs).
These risks, which are the consequence of centralization, seem
not to be of concerns to most of the clients of OSNs such as
Facebook and Twitter. But they are, or should be, of serious
concerns to many other current and potential applications of
OSNs.
Several recent attempts have been made to decentralize
OSNs, by letting each member of such a network keep
maintaining its own data. But this DOSN approach to decen-
tralization is not able to establish any kind of regularity over
the social network, which is necessary for both real life social
community, as well as for OSNs.
We have introduced a decentralized architecture of OSNs,
called OSC, for online social community, which is able to
establish regularities concerning both the membership of OSC
and the manner in which its members interact. The preliminary
testing and experiments of our implementation show that our
method is feasible and promising.
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